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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
IDA JOYCE WILSON,

Industrial Commission
No. 85000166

Appellant/Plaintiff,
Utah Supreme Court
No, 21013

vs.

Priority No, h

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF
UTAH, WORKMENfS COMPENSATION
DIVISION,
Respondents/Defendants•

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

STATEMENT,, QF_ ISSUE, PRESENTED, QN__ APPEAL
1,

Was the Industrial Commission correct

in concluding that

the applicant,

Ida Joyce Wilson, did not sustain back injuries as

a result of

compensable

a

industrial

accident

which allegedly

occurred on September 7, 1984?
STATEMENT.OF_TBIL CASE

A Petition for Writ of Review was filed by the plaintiff, Ida
Joyce Wilson for review of an

Order of

the Industrial Commission

holding that Mrs. Wilson did not sustain injuries as a result of a
compensable industrial accident on September 7,

\HH4f and thereby

denying her claim for benefits.
DISPQSITIQEL BY_ THE,INDUSTRIAL, COMMISSION
A hearmq

was held

on June

13, 1985

before the Industrial

Commission Administrative Law Judge Janet L. Moffitt

on Ida Joyce

Wilson's

application

for

workmen's

September 17, 1985 an Order was

compensation

entered by

benefits. On

Judge Moffitt denying

Mrs. Wilson's claim for benefits.
A Motion

for Review was filed by Ida Joyce Wilson on October

2, 1985. On October 23, 1985 the Industrial Commission denied the
Motion for

Review, and

the Administrative

Law Judge's Order was

affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In September of 1984 Mrs. Ida Joyce Wilson was
cook for

the Utah

State School

time she had held
(R 17)

On

that

for the Deaf and Blind.

position

September 7,

of

a cookout

others

the

co-worker,
Cobb,

went

with

Barbara
to

and

Mrs. Dalpias's
be used

for the

school.

Dalpias,

grill which was to

employment

for

At that

two years.

1984 the Utah State School for the Deaf

and Blind was sponsoring
associated

employed as a

Mrs. Wilson, along with a

their

home

for the

staff, teachers, and

supervisor, Mr. Richard

to pick up a large portable
cookout.

(R

18)

Mrs. Cobb

wheeled the portable grill from Mrs. Dalpias's shed to the back of
a State truck which had been backed up next to
Mrs. Wilson claims

that once

back of the truck,

Mr. Cobb ordered

the

left

handle.

handle

of

the

grill

Mrs. Wilson alleges

grill into

the back

her back.

(R 19,

contention

that

the grill

had been

she

(R 18)

wheeled to the

Mrs. Wilson to

while

that

the curb.

take hold of

he had hold of the right
and

Mr. Cobb

lifted the

of the truck, thereby sustaining injuries to

20, 23)
Mr. Cobb

It
alone
2

is Mr. Cobb's

and Mrs. Dalpias's

lifted the grill into the truck

while

Mrs. Dalpias

grill so as to

and

Mrs. Wilson

steady it

so it

were

on either side of the

wouldn't tip

over.

(R 140-143;

exhibits D-7 and D-8)
On September
from

20, 1984, Mrs. Wilson sought medical treatment

Dr. Richard

Sorenson.

No

Barton.

mention

She

was

was

made

also

to

treated

either

of

by Dr. Bruce
these treating

physicians of the possible industrial nature of her problems until
December of

1984.

reason she did not
grill was

(R

40 and

promptly

because she

of her problem.

tell

Dr. Barton

about

It was

not until

the conclusion

December of

1984 that

that her

back was injured by

This was not the first incident in which

Mrs. Wilson has had

allegedly lifting the grill.

(R 60)

problems with her lower back.

In 1978, while working as a laborer

at a potatoe processing plant, she complained of
back

lifting the

was not certain whether that was the cause

(R 46)

Mrs. Wilson reached

147). Mrs. Wilson stated that the

pain,

and

occasions.

was

treated

(R 51 and 147)

grill cook at the Mill
treated for

Stream

severe lower

C-curve to

the left

In May of 1982, while working as a
Restaurant,

Mrs. Wilson

was also

In 1984, Mrs. Wilson told

condition first

bothered her

on May

(R 57 and 147)

the

"Initial

Report"

to

the

Program which was signed by Dr. Barton
is stated

Dr. West on five separate

back pains.

Dr. Barton that her present

In

one

X-rays disclosed a severe lumbar

with rotation.

28, 1982.

by

cervical and low

that the

incident of
3

Public

Employees Health

on September

injury is

26, 1984, it

"not known."

(R 123;

exhibit D-4)

In an "Application for Treatment" form completed by

Mrs. Wilson for

Dr. Barton on

September 20,

1984f the following

questions and answers appear:
Question: How did

this condition

develop?

(What caused it?

How did it start?)
Answer:

Car wreck 17 years ago.

A job which required heavy

lifting 9 years ago.
Question: When

was

the

first

time

you were aware of this

problem?
Answer:

6 years ago.

Question: Have you ever had this problem
before?
Answer:

or similar problems

If yes, please explain.

Yes, after the car wreck.

Question: Any accidents,

falls, etc. that

might have caused

your problem?
Answer:

Heavy lifting 9 years ago.

(R 130-131; exhibit D-4.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Ida Joyce Wilson alleges that she
back

during

the

course

Mrs. Wilson
the

is

to her

of employment/ while lifting a portable

grill on September 7, 1984.
although

sustained injuries

It

is

respondents

suffering
result

problems,

compensable

these

not

examining the

entire record, there is much evidence which contra-

4

a

back

injuries were

dicts Mrs. Wilsonfs allegations.

of

from

contention that

Further,

accident.

In

the Administrative Law

Judge

concluded

that

Mrs. Wilson's testimony was not convincing

nor credible.
A decision of the Industrial Commission may not be overturned
unless said

decision is

arbitrary or

capricious, wholly without

cause, or without any substantial evidence to support it.
the

order

of

the

Industrial

Commission

capricious, the Supreme Court is powerless
compensation benefits.
Commission

which

was

Because

not arbitrary or

to direct

an award of

Therefore, the decision of the Industrial

denied

benefits

to

Mrs. Wilson,

must

be

affirmed.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S DECISION WHICH DENIED
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION BENEFITS TO IDA JOYCE WILSON
WAS NOT ARBITRARY OR CAPRICIOUS, WHOLLY WITHOUT
CAUSE, OR WITHOUT ANY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO
SUPPORT IT? AND THEREFORE THE ORDER OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION MAY NOT BE OVERTURNED.
The appellant in the case at bar, Ida
that the

Industrial Commission

not sustain injuries
accident.

as

Mrs. Wilson

a

erred in

result

has

Joyce Wilson, contends

of

petitioned

concluding that she did

a

compensable industrial

this Court to review the

Commissions Order denying her workmen's compensation benefits.
The standard of review which has been utilized

by this Court

in Industrial Commission cases is stringent and there are numerous
cases which have articulated
the Utah

Supreme Court

down by the Industrial

the power

or scope

of review which

possesses with regard to decisions handed
Commission.
5

One

such case

which clearly

sets

forth

the

proper

v. Monfredi, 631 P.2d

standard

888

(Utah

is

Kaiser

1981).

Steel, Corporation

In

Kaiser,

the Court

stated:
Under any of these standards . . . it is
apparent that
this
Courts1
function in
reviewing Commission findings of fact is a
strictly limited one in which the question is
not whether the Court agrees with the Commission's findings or whether they are supported
by the preponderance of evidence. Insteadf
the reviewing court's inquiry is whether the
Commission's
findings
are
"arbitrary or
capricious," or "wholly without cause" or
contrary to the "one [inevitable] conclusion
from the evidence" or without "any substantial
evidence" to support them.
Only then should
the Commissions findings be displaced.
631 P.2d at 890.
!n K a i s e r , t h e Court
^^IUdU5iiial

CfiffiMsslfllJr

also
67

cited
Utah

with

a p p r o v a l Kfi^SlinaKis

174, 1 8 1 - 8 2 , 184, 246 P 698,

700, 701 ( 1 9 2 6 ) :
What we hold is that in case . . . we are
asked to overturn the findings and conclusions
of the commission which appear to be in conflict with or contrary to the evidence, it
must be clearly made to appear to us that the
commission acted arbitrarily or capriciously
and wholly without cause in rejecting or
refusing to
give effect to the evidence
. . . Any other conclusion would make this
court merely a reviewing court with power to
weight the probative effect of the evidence
. . . Unless therefore it can be said, upon
the whole record, that the Commission clearly
acted arbitrarily or capriciously in making
its findings and decision, this court is
powerless to interfere. Such is the manifest
purpose and intent of the Workmen's Compensation
Act . . . It
was not intended,
. . . that this Court, in matters of evidence,
should to any extent substitute its judgment
for the judgment of the commission.
631 P.2d at 889

6

Norri_s_y_.__Industrial
(1936) is another case

Commission, 90

which

was

Utah 256,

concerned

with

61 P.2d 413,
the

scope of

review which the Supreme Court may exercise over a decision handed
down by the Industrial Commission.

Norris

was

also

cited with

approval in the Kaiser opinion.
In

Norrig,

the

applicant

Industrial Commission which denied
based

her

appeal

upon

the

her

from

an

benefits.

contention

testimony clearly showed that her
injuries incurred

appealed

order of the
The applicant

that the uncontradicted

husband

died

as

a

result of

while in the course of employment and that the

decision of the Industrial

Commission

was

contrary

to

and not

sustained by any substantial evidence.
In

its' opinion

affirming

the

order

of

the

Commission, the Utah Supreme Court stated:
Again, therefore, we have the old case of
a conflict of evidence which it is for the
commission to resolve. It may be well to sum
up the principles laid down in a number of
previous cases regarding the jurisdiction of
this court over awards and orders of the
commission.
The Legislature has, in effect, said:
"The Commission is the final arbiter of the
facts.
If there is error in judgment or
conclusions of or from facts, it must be the
Commission's error and remain
there.
We
give the Supreme Court the right to speak only
by warrant of law in compensation cases when
it speaks in reference to errors of law
alleged to have been made
by the Commission." . . .
Where the matter presented on appeal is
the question of whether the commission should
have in law arrived at a conclusion of fact
different from that at which it did arrive

7

Industrial

from the evidence, a question of law is
presented only when it is claimed that the
commission could only arrive at one conclusion
from the evidence, and that it found contrary
to that inevitable conclusion*
But in order
to reverse the commission in this regard it
must appear at least that (a) the evidence is
uncontradicted, and (b) there is nothing in
the record which,is intrinsically discrediting
to the uncontradicted testimony and (c) that
the uncontradicted evidence is not wholly that
of interested witnesses or, if the uncontradicted evidence is wholly or partly from
others than interested witnesses, that the
record shows no bias or prejudice on the part
of such other witnesses, and (d) the uncontradicted evidence is such as to carry a measure
of conviction to the reasonable mind and
sustain the burden of proof, and (e) precludes
any other explanation or hypothesis as being
more or equally as reasonable, and (f) there
is nothing in the record which would indicate
that the presence of the witnesses gave the
commission such an advantage over the court in
aid to its conclusions that the conclusions
should for that reason not be disturbed.
If the commission should decide against
the
uncontradicted
evidence
under those
conditions, its decision would as a matter of
law be arbitrary and capricious, which is
another way of saying that it
would be
unreasonable.
61 P.2d at 415.
Elsewhere in the Norris case, the Court said:
A reading of the record convinces us that the
commission might well have found that the
death was caused by the accident [and therefore be compensable]. We are not prepared to
say that the record does not show that the
more probable cause of [death was the work
related injury rather than some independent
cause], but it is not our province to measure
the relative probabilities. That is for the
commission.
61 P.2d at 414.

8

Accordingly, applying

the above

cited authority to the case

at bar, the Supreme Court is powerless to

overturn the Industrial

Commissions order unless it can be said that based upon the entire
record, the Industrial Commission
capriciously
fits.

in

denying

and

capriciously,

at bar,

not

the

we

may

refer to the Norrls decision

a reviewable

when it is claimed that the
conclusion from

arbitrarily and

or

wherein the Court stated that in
the case

acted

the Wilson workmen's compensation bene-

To determine whether

trarily

clearly

Commission

a situation

acted arbi-

such as

the one in

question of law is presented only

commission could

the evidence,

arrive at

only one

and that if found contrary to that

inevitable conclusion.
Assuming that Ida Wilson did make
upon

the

evidence

the

commission

the contention
could

have reached only one

inevitable conclusion, and failed to reach
are certain

criteria which

the decision was

that based

that conclusion, there

must be met in order to conclude that

arbitrary

and

capricious,

thereby

allowing a

reversal of the commissions order.
This "test,"

as set forth in Norris, for determining whether

or not a decision is arbitrary and capricious is set
conjunctive

such

that

each

of

warrant a reversal of the order.
criteria which
dicted

and

forth in the

the six criteria must be met to
61 P.2d

at 415.

The first two

Morris refers to is that the evidence is uncontrathat

there

is

nothing

in

the

record

which is

intrinsically discrediting to the uncontradicted testimony.

9

Applying this "test" to the case at bar, it is clear that the
Industrial Commission did not act arbitrarily
reaching their

conclusion.

In examining the entire record, it is

readily apparent that there is a great deal
contradictory.

Mrs. Wilson

claims

Mr. Richard
contend that
but rather

of evidence

that

injury while lifting a portable grill
(R 19, 20, 23)

and capriciously in

she

which is

incurred her back

into the

back of

a truck.

This evidence is contradicted by the statements of

Cobb

and

Mrs. Barbara

Mrs. Wilson did
it was

Dalpias,

not lift

Mr. Cobb, along,

wherein

they both

the grill into the truck,

who lifted

the grill, while

Mrs. Wilson and Mrs. Dalpias merely steadied it to ensure that the
grill would not tip

over.

(R

Mrs. Wilson alleges

that the

140-143;

exhibits

D-7

and D-8)

Administrative Law Judge improperly

considered these written statements

of Mr. Cobb

and Mrs. Dalpias

because said statements were unsupported by oral testimony.
respondents
considered

contention
because

of

that
the

these
fact

Mrs. Wilson, stipulated to the

statements

were

It is

properly

that Mr. Helgesen, counsel for

admission of

Mrs. Dalpias1 state-

ment.
(Mr. Helgesen)
Question: I have

a statement, Mrs. Wilson, that appears

to be from Barbara
stand

she

is

not

Dalpias.
here,

and

And
she

you underhas

had

problems getting here?
Answer:

Dh-huh.

Mr. Helgesen:

So

record.
in

the statement

may be

entered in the

Question: I have some questions about that.
that she

is saying

It appears

that you didn't help lift

that grill.
Does that make sense to you?
Answer:

She is saying
grill?
sen?

Did

that
I hear

I

didn't

help

lift the

you correctly, Mr. Helge-

Did she say that I did not help lift the

grill?
Mr. Helgesen:

I

think it would be best, your Honor, if

we stipulated to the

admission

have it marked as an exhibit.
The Court:

this, and

May we do that?

Surely.

Mr* Helgesen:
The Court:

of

Then I can question from that:

You bet.

Mr. Silvester:

Fine.

(R 26-27)
Because

the

admissibility

of

Mrs. Dalpias1

stipulated to, it was certainly proper for the
Judge

to

consider

her

statement

in

statement was

Administrative Law

weighing

the

evidence.

Further, because said statement was admissible evidence, it may be
used to
dicted

corroborate the
Mrs. Wilson's

statement of Mr. Cobb which also contra-

testimony.

Pursuant

to

U.C.A. § 35-1-88

(1953) , the Industrial Commission is not bound by the usual common
law or statutory rules of evidence:
35-1-88. Rules of evidence and procedure
before commission and hearing examiner—Admissible evidence.—Neither the commission nor
its hearing examiner shall be bound by the
11

usual common-law
or
statutory
rules of
evidence, or by any technical or formal rules
of procedure, other than as herein provided or
as adopted by the commission pursuant to this
act. The commission may make its investigation in such manner as in its judgment is best
calculated to ascertain the substantial rights
of the parties and to carry out justly the
spirit of the Workmen f s Compensation Act.
The commission may receive as evidence
and use as proof of any fact in dispute all
evidence deemed material and relevant including, but not limited to the following:
(a)
Depositions
and
presented in open hearings.

sworn

(b) Reports of attending
physicians, or of pathologists.

testimony

or examining

(c) Reports of investigators appointed by
the commission.
(d) Reports
of
employers, including
copies of time sheets, book accounts or other
records.
(e) Hospital records in the
injured or diseased employee.

case

of an

There is an abundance of case law interpreting this statute.
This Court has long recognized the considerable differences that exist between court
trials and proceedings before administrative
agencies, and that the technical rules of
evidence need not be applied in the latter.
The Court has also held that hearsay evidence
is
admissible
in proceedings before the
Industrial
Commission
. . .
However, a
finding of fact cannot be based solely on
hearsay evidence, but must be "supported by a
residuum of legal evidence competent in a
court of law."
Sandy,State Bank Y^Bximball, 636 P.2d 481, 486
(Utah 1981).
See alsoflagJsf£xd~^-Ifldiis£xial-£jQmmission,11 U.2d
312, 358 P.2d 899 (1961); Yacht Club v. Liquor Control Commission,
681 P.2d 1224 (Utah 1984).
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Accordingly,

Mrs. Dalpiasfs

because

evidence which is competent

in

a

court

statement

of

law,

is

and

legal

it makes

substantially the same averments as Mr. Cobbs statement, it may be
used to

support Mr. Cobbs

Industrial

Commission

to

statement, and

it was

consider

evidence in making its

such

proper for the

findings.
Thus, because the statements of Mr. Cobb and Mrs. Dalpias are
in

direct

contradiction

to

Mrs. Wilson's

testimony, the first

criteria of the Norris "test" has not been met, and as this "test"
is set

forth in

the conjunctive, there is no need to examine the

remaining 5 criteria.
It should also be noted that the various reports of attending
and

examining

physicians

contain

much

information

contradictory to the testimony of Mrs. Wilson.
contends that

which

is

While Mrs. Wilson

she incurred back injuries while lifting a portable

grill within the course of

employment,

the

various

reports and

records appear to indicate otherwise.
As

previously

mentioned

in

the statement of facts, in the

"Initial Report" to the Public Employees Health Program

which was

signed by Dr. Barton, it was stated that the incident of injury is
"not known".
for Treatment"

(R 123; exhibit

D-4)

form, Mrs. Wilson

Further,

in an "Application

stated that

her back condition

developed from "a car wreck 17 years ago; and a job which required
heavy lifting nine years ago."
the

heavy

problems.

lifting

nine

years

She also stated in this form, that
ago

(R 130-131; exhibit D-4)
13

may

have

caused

her back

Thus, when

the entire record is considered, and the numerous

contradictions are

revealed,

Commission's decision
without

cause.

it

is

clear

that

the Industrial

was not arbitrary and capricious, or wholly

Accordingly,

the

decision

is

not

subject to

reversal*
A,
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ARE THE SOLE
JUDGES OF THE CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES AND ARE
NOT
REQUIRED
TO
BELIEVE
UNCONTRADICTED
TESTIMONY UNLESS THERE IS NOTHING IN THE
RECORD WHICH IS INTRINSICALLY DISCREDITING TO
THE TESTIMONY.
In Chief_ Cpnsglidated., Miningn, Company^Vj^Industrigj._Coipmission
of,Utah,

260 P

271, 274

Utah 1927),

the Supreme

Court of Utah

stated:
[T]his court, in cases arising under the
Industrial Act, has uniformly held that the
Industrial Commission are the sole judges of
the credibility of the witnesses, the weight
of the evidence, and the facts . • •
In

denying

compensation

Commission stated

to

Mrs, Wilson,

not

convincing.

credible."

and

Administrative

therefore

demeanor, she was in
evaluate

"The

applicant's

her physicians

testimony

was

not

(R 148)

Because the
hearing

Industrial

that the Applicant's explanation of why she did

not mention the incident (the alleged accident) to
was

the

the

in

a much

credibility,

Law

Judge

was

present

at the

a position to observe the applicant's
better position
or

lack

than this

thereof,

Court to

of the Applicant.

Thus, in accordance with Chief Con_SQlidatgdMj.pj.pg, Company,

14

it is

within the

sole province

of the

Industrial Commission to assess

a witness's credibility in reaching its conclusion.
This issue of credibility
mentioned

Norris

"test"

Industrial Commission

may also

in

acted

be tied

determining

arbitrarily

into the afore-

whether
and

or

not

the

capriciously.

The

second criteria of the Norris "test" states that a decision may be
arbitrary and capricious if "there is nothing in

the record which

is intrinsically discrediting to the uncontradicted testimony."
Although there
let us assume for
uncontradicted.

is a plethora of contradiction in the record,
one

moment

which

testimony.

Mrs. Wilson's

testimony was

In order for this Court to reverse the Industrial

Commission's order, it must
record

that

is

appear that

intrinsically

there is

discrediting

This is clearly not the case.

In

to

nothing in the
Mrs. Wilson's

determining whether

or not there was anything discrediting to Mrs. Wilson's testimony,
the

Commission

determined

that

looked

at

the

Mrs. Wilson's

facts

and

testimony

circumstances,
lacked

and

credibility.

Mrs. Wilson alleges that she was injured on September 7, 1984, yet
she did
4, 1984c

not mention to anyone the alleged accident until December
(R 40)

In the Findings of Factf Conclusions of Law, and

Order, it is stated:
First, the Applicant did not report any sort
of industrial involvement to her treating
physicians until
sometime in December of
1984. The Administrative Law Judge finds it
very difficult
to believe
that had the
incident occurred as described by the Applicant, she would not have made mention of it to
at least her treating physicians immediately
upon receiving
treatment.
The Applicants
15

explanation of why she did not mention the
incident to her physicians was not convincing.
(R 148)
Thus, because Mrs. Wilson was not convincing or credible, her
testimony

was

intrinsically

discrediting,

and

therefore

the

Industrial Commissions decision was not arbitrary or capricious.
A

case

which

further

supports

respondent's

position

is

Mssell^v^Industrial_Cpmmissi^n, 43 P.2d 1069 (Utah 1935) wherein
this Court stated:
In the instant case there is
no direct
evidence as to when, how, or where Mr. Russell
received the blister on his toe.
He may have
received the injury while he was working at
the mill, but he may, so far as the evidence
discloses, have received it elsewhere. When
any one of two or more inferences may reasonably be drawn from the evidence, this court is
not authorized to direct which inference must
be drawn, and, likewise, when, as in the
instant case, it is somewhat of a speculation
as to where or how the deceased received the
injury complained of, this court is precluded
from directing an award.
To entitle the
plaintiff to prevail upon this review the
evidence must be such that the only reasonable
inference permissible
is
that Mr. Russen
received an accidental injury growing out of
or in the course of his employment and that
such injury
resulted in his death.
The
evidence before us does not measure up to that
standard.
The
commission may well have
entertained grave doubt as to when and where
Mr. Russell received the blister on his toe.
43 P.2d at 1073.
The

Russell

holding

may

be

applied

Mrs. Wilson may have received her injury
far

as

elsewhere.

the

evidence

As in Russell#

discloses,
the cause
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she

to

the case at bar.

as she

alleges, but, so

may

have

received

of Mrs. Wilson's

it

injury is

speculative, and

there is

drawn

evidence.

from

the

more than

one inference

which may be

Accordingly, this Court is precluded

from directed an award,
CONCLUSION
In

denying

Industrial

compensation

Commission

did

benefits

to

Mrs. Wilson,

the

not act arbitrarily and capriciously,

wholly without cause, or contrary to the one inevitable conclusion
from the

evidence.

Rather,

evidence such that there
drawn.

And,

inasmuch as

the record

is not
it is

is full of contradictory

one inevitable
not within

conclusion to be

the province of this

Court to measure the

relative probabilities,

respectfully request

that the Utah Supreme Court affirm the order

of the Industrial Commission

which denied

benefits to

Wilson.
DATED this / ^ day of November, 1986.
BLACK & MOORE
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